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Editorial suggestion: that the headings before paragraphs 3, 12, and 20 be single-spaced in order to make them stand out as headings (rather than appear as an underscored passage in the text).

Substitute for paragraphs 13-16

13. The Kremlin has presumably given serious consideration to an open attack on Yugoslavia by satellite forces as a means of overthrowing the Tito regime and reducing Yugoslavia to satellite status. The fact that it has not resorted to that course of action would indicate that hitherto it has judged such a course to be inexpedient. Many considerations would support such a judgment. An obviously conclusive consideration is that hitherto the Satellite forces have been incapable of overcoming prospective Yugoslav resistance.

14. There can be no assurance, however, that the Kremlin's estimate of this situation has not changed. It has become apparent that the Tito regime can hardly be overthrown except by force of arms. The general deterioration of the international situation may well have caused the Kremlin to regard the solution of the Yugoslav problem as a matter of greater urgency. Recent defections of Italian Communists would have the same effect. Meanwhile the Satellite States have made intensive preparations for war (augmentation of forces in being; re-equipment, especially with heavy weapons; stockpiling of military supplies; and industrial mobilization) under Soviet direction and with Soviet material assistance. These preparations have reversed the balance of military strength between Yugoslavia and the Satellite States. The only remaining deterrent is the increased danger that an attack on Yugoslavia might develop into general war. The Kremlin, however, may discount the possibility of effective Western action in behalf of Yugoslavia in view of the commitment of Western forces and resources to other areas

(the Far East and Western Europe). From that point of view, the Yugoslav

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problem is to be solved by force, the sooner now the better the prospect.

15. The current military preparations in the Satellite States are not conclusive as to the Kremlin's intentions, but they are strongly indicative and do constitute the creation of a new capability. A Satellite attack on Yugoslavia must during 1951 must therefore be regarded as a serious possibility.

16. Yugoslav defensive capabilities are severely limited by the fact that Yugoslav military equipment is largely of German and Soviet origin, presenting insoluble problems of maintenance and resupply. Re-equipment from Western sources is prevented by both practical difficulties and political considerations. In present circumstances, organized resistance by the Yugoslav armed forces could not be long maintained at heavy rates of expenditure -- for no more than three or four months in the event of attack by the adjacent Satellite States (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania). If, however, substantial Western military assistance in form suitable for Yugoslav use could be delivered well in advance of such an attack, Yugoslavia might well be thereby enabled to defend itself successfully.

17. If the Yugoslav armed forces were to be overcome guerrilla resistance would continue. Such resistance, however, would also require Western assistance in order to be effective and prolonged.

Substitute for paragraphs 20-21.

20. The Kremlin has openly committed its prestige in the struggle to overthrow Tito. It is unlikely, however, that it would commit Soviet forces to an open and direct attack on Yugoslavia until all other means

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had been exhausted, and then only after due consideration of the probable consequences in terms of the global situation. The Soviet forces now in adjacent lands (Austria, Hungary, Rumania) are not sufficient for a primarily Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. It is probable that such an attack is not now intended.

21. In present circumstances Yugoslav organized resistance to a Soviet attack in force might be maintained for about a month if the Yugoslav armed forces succeeded in withdrawing relatively intact to the mountainous area of Bosnia-Herzegovina-Montenegro. Otherwise organized resistance would be over in about two weeks. If substantial and suitable Western military assistance had been received before the attack, organized resistance would last appreciably longer and the invasion would prove more costly to the USSR. In any case Yugoslavia would eventually be reduced to a guerrilla resistance dependant on Western support for effectiveness and duration.

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